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Abstract 
Using the change in ordinary dividend payout as a proxy for improved governance, I show that cross-listing in 
the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the minority ordinary shareholders of exchange listed non-
U.S. firms.  These firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance.  I find no such effect for Rule 144a firms.  
Interestingly, I document evidence inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis for Level 1 firms.  I believe 
that their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing is primarily due to their ability to credibly commit to fair 
treatment of their minority investors, given their record for equitable treatment of their ordinary shareholders.  
They achieve this reputation by consistently paying out a sizable proportion of their earnings as dividends.  I find 
that the firm-level governance of Level 1 firms, as measured by the number of closely held shares improves in 
the post-listing period.  I find no such effect for Rule 144a traded firms.   My results also have important 
implications for the agency models of dividends.   
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1.  Introduction 
 The ability of firms to finance investment opportunities, over and above retained earnings is largely 
contingent on the effectiveness of their domestic legal system to sufficiently protect minority shareholders.  The 
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extant literature suggests that where the providers of capital are sufficiently protected, their required return is 
lower resulting in a lower cost of both debt and equity capital for firms (e.g., Hail and Leuz (2003)).  
Consequently, high-growth firms domiciled in countries characterised by poor legal institutional frameworks, and 
thus poor investor protection, are very often constrained in their attempts to finance their growth opportunities 
externally (e.g., Demerguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)).  Absent effective legal reform, many firms engage in 
substitute strategies designed to fund their investment opportunity set.  For example, the extant literature 
suggests that such firms can engage in cross-border strategic alliances (e.g., Siegel (2006)), seek political favour 
(e.g. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2003)), or commit themselves to greater protection of their minority 
shareholders by improving their internal firm-level governance (e.g., Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim 
(2005, DK Hereafter)).  Furthermore, a firm can substitute their domestic level governance for the superior 
disclosure and regulatory regime of the United States by cross listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ (e.g., 
Coffee (1999, 2002), Stulz (1999), Reese and Weisbach (2002, RW Hereafter), Doidge (2004), Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (2004)).  Consequently, the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities through domestic 
financing, post-listing in the U.S., suggests a commitment on the part of firms to better protect their investors1 
 By ‘opting-in’ to the U.S. governance regime, these firms endeavour to encourage investment in their 
firm by committing to adopt the reporting obligations of U.S. firms.  As such, the legal bonding hypothesis 
suggests that at least in terms of investor protection, investors should be indifferent between investing in U.S. 
firms or non-U.S. American depositary receipts.  However, this line of reasoning has been questioned within the 
literature.  For example, its most vocal critics (e.g., Siegel (2004), Licht (2003, 2004)) consistently argue that the 
number of SEC actions against ill-behaved foreign firms has been few, and Licht (2003) goes so far as to suggest 
that the enforcement laws put in place by the SEC remain largely ‘illusionary’ for non-U.S. firms, as non-U.S. 
firms are subjected to a less stringent regime than that laid out for U.S. firms.  In connection, Siegel (2004) 
outlines that over the period from 1995 to 2001 the SEC took legal action against just five foreign firms2.  So 
while it appears that the holders of ADRs are not as well protected as are the holders of domestically listed U.S. 
firms, they do enjoy the benefits of ‘Reputational Bonding’ from listing in the U.S. (e.g., King and Segal (2004, 
KS Hereafter), Siegel (2004)) i.e. enhanced monitoring from ‘Reputational Intermediaries’ (i.e. financial analysts, 
underwriters, auditors).  In support Stulz (2005, p. 1632) concludes that “Although this monitoring [from listing 
in the U.S.] may at times seem weak and tentative, it is monitoring that otherwise would not have taken place”.  
Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2005, DKLMS Hereafter) conclude that such monitoring acts as a 
sizable deterrent preventing many firms from cross listing. 
 I examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. affords additional protection to those investors who have 
already made the investment decision and invested in the firm i.e. the ordinary shareholders, as opposed to those 
                                                 
1 Ribstein (2005) outlines other alternatives to cross listing.  These include certification, a sale without listing and local incorporation.  In 
addition, a related literature outlines how domestic exchanges have in response to sizable migrations of firms to U.S. capital markets improved 
their governance requirements.  Dewenter, Kim, Lim, and Novaes (2005) and Carvalho and Pennacchi (2005) examine the impact of 
enhanced stock exchange governance regulations on firm value using Korean and Brazilian exchanges, respectively.  They show that 
improved exchange governance enhances firm value.  In a similar vein, Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) using the two major 
Indian stock exchanges demonstrate how demutualized exchanges are superior to mutualized exchanges in terms of governance.           
2 Joos (2003, p. 396) concludes that “At the very least, empirical work suggests that the effectiveness of the bonding role of the SEC 
regulation presents an empirical question rather than an established fact”. 
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investors that invest post-listing i.e. ADR holders.  The majority of non-U.S. firms that ‘opt-in’ to the U.S. 
governance regime do not ‘opt-out’ of their domestic regime.  So while it is clear that the ADR holders are 
protected, although not to the same extent as those investors that hold U.S. firms, it is not clear whether the 
holders of the firms’ ordinary shares enjoy the same level of additional investor protection.  In fact, Aggarwal, 
Dahiya, and Klapper (2005, p.3) suggest, “ADR holders have better legal standing compared to holders of the 
underlying security as the ADRs are purchased in the U.S”.  I examine whether the ordinary shareholders i.e. the 
holders of the underlying security enjoy any incremental protection under the U.S. governance regime.     
 In order to examine whether cross listing in the U.S. provides incremental protection for 
minority/ordinary shareholders, I follow the approach advocated by Benos and Weisbach (2004, p. 229).  They 
argue that, given that regulatory bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher, “the issue of economic 
importance is whether managers and investors perceive cross-listings to have incremental protection or not.  To 
examine this proposition, the appropriate approach is not to count SEC actions and debate whether they are 
important or not.  Rather it is to examine the data for empirical implications of the hypothesis that cross-listings 
provide incremental protection, and therefore serve as a device enabling managers of non-U.S. firms to commit 
to protect the interests of their minority shareholders”. 
 I examine the ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms around a cross-listing in the U.S.  Our 
choice of variable is motivated by the fact that dividend payout is increasing in the level of investor protection 
(e.g., LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifler, and Vishny (2000, LLSV Hereafter)) and, consequently changes in 
external investor protection are associated with changes in firm dividend payout (e.g., Liu (2002)), controlling for 
firm, industry and country level determinants of dividend payout.  In addition, the choice of dependent variable 
is motivated by my desire to isolate the impact of cross listing on the domestic/ordinary shareholders (as against 
the ADR shareholders) of cross-listed firms.  I employ the ordinary dividend payout of firms to achieve this goal.  
The agency models of dividends do not rely on specific rights per se, but rest on the premise that country laws 
and/or governance practices allow minority shareholders greater rights in general.  I argue that firms may only 
pay lower dividends if they perceive that their minority investors will accept lower dividends for improvements 
in investor protection, as dividend cuts are costly.  Minority/ordinary shareholders are more likely to accept 
lower dividends post-listing if they are compensated for reduced dividends with enhanced protection from listing 
in the U.S.  Easterbrook (1984) outlined how governance practices and dividends are substitutes for one another.  
I argue that the additional protection afforded to minority investors from listing in the U.S. derive not only from 
additional general rights per se, but also from a reduced ability of controlling insiders to consume private benefits 
(e.g., Barzuza (2005), Doidge (2004), DKLMS (2005)).   
 Using a sample of 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries, I find that exchange-listed firms pay 
significantly lower dividends, post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of firm, industry and country 
controls.  This result is consistent with the notion that these investors are better protected under the U.S. regime, 
and suggests that both managers and investors “perceive cross-listings to have incremental protection”.  In line 
with my expectations, I find no evidence to suggest that the ordinary shareholders of Rule 144a firms benefit 
from incremental protection, post-listing.  Interestingly, my results suggest that the minority investors of Level 1 
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firms are better protected.  Although inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, I show that these firms 
consistently establish a reputation for better protection of their investors by paying out a greater proportion of 
their earnings as dividends.  Consequently, their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing may well result from a 
voluntary commitment on the part of these firms to protect their investors that is credible given their reputation 
for fair treatment.  In support of this argument I find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 firms, as 
measured by the number of closely held shares improves in the post-listing period.  I find no such effect for Rule 
144a-traded firms.    
 My results have also important implications for the agency models of dividends.  I find support for both 
the outcome and substitution models of dividends.  More specifically, I find that in all cross-sectional periods, 
and over the full sample period, dividend payouts are significantly higher in countries where minority investors 
enjoy greater legal protection.  In addition, and in line with Liu (2002), Zhang (2005), and Hwang, Park, and Park 
(2004, HPP Hereafter), I document support in favour of the substitute model of dividends: governance 
improvements substitute for dividends as a mechanism of controlling the agency costs associated with free cash 
flow.  This finding is also consistent with the evidence that inter alia, improved governance helps explain why 
dividend payouts have been falling over time (e.g., Fama and French (2001), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (2003))3.  This of course suggests that the relation between dividend payouts and governance is non-
constant and as such purely cross-sectional tests are biased towards acceptance of the outcome model of 
dividends.  My results suggest that both models are not directly competing against one another. 
 
2.  Cross-listing in the United States and the legal bonding hypothesis  
 Non-U.S. firms can cross-list in the U.S., either directly as ordinary shares or as American Depositary 
Receipts (ADR).  Absent Canadian and Israeli firms, the majority of non-U.S. firms list as ADRs.  A sponsored, 
public Level 1 OTC depositary receipt program is the simplest way for non-US firms to access U.S. and non-U.S. 
capital markets. They trade ‘over-the-counter’ and also on some exchanges outside of the U.S., with prices 
published on the “Pink Sheets”.  A Rule 144A depositary receipt program, established by the SEC in 1990 
facilitates access to U.S. and non-U.S. markets through a private placement of sponsored depositary receipts to 
Qualified Institutional Buyers.  Trades are executed under the Portal system, and cleared through the Depositary 
Receipt Trust. Like Level 1 issues, they do not require compliance with U.S. G.A.A.P. or SEC registration. Under 
Regulation S, a company can offer a depositary receipt program to non-US investors on Designated Offshore 
Securities Markets ‘DOSM’.  Unlike Level 1 or Rule144a ADRs, cross-listing in the U.S. via a Level 2/3 
exchange-listed ADR (or a direct listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ) obligates these firms to provide fuller 
disclosures under U.S. G.A.A.P., and operate under the mantra of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), thus becoming subject to their enforcement powers.  Furthermore, cross-listing in the U.S. also affords 
minority investors the means to exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies, unavailable at home, and exposes 
the firms to what Coffee (2002) terms “Reputational Intermediaries”: underwriters (in the case of Level 3 capital-
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Ikenberry and Julio (2004) document a rebound in this trend.  They show that since 2000 the proportion of U.S. firms paying 
cash dividends has increased and relate much of this shift to the maturity hypothesis.  
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raising firms), financial analysts, auditors and bond rating agencies.  The extant literature has documented how 
each can play a vital role in monitoring firms, facilitating the production of firm-specific private information into 
public information (See Lang, Lins, and Miller (2002, LLM Hereafter)).  The legal bonding hypothesis outlines 
how such additional disclosures and monitoring allows firms to effectively ‘rent’ the U.S. governance regime by 
listing on a U.S. exchange.  Unlike exchange-level ADRs, Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are not required to 
become “reporting companies” under the U.S. disclosure and regulatory environment (e.g., Coffee (2002)).  
Accordingly, the incremental protection benefits that accrue to the shareholders of cross-listing firms, if they do 
exist, apply only to exchange-listed ADRs.   
 
3.  Data 
 I begin by obtaining a complete list of depositary receipts from the Bank of New York 
(www.adrbny.com) and cross-reference this list with data sourced from Deutsche Bank (www.adr.db.com), JP 
Morgan (www.adr.com) and Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr).  From each I am able to obtain the names, listing 
dates, the firms’ country of origin, and the type of depositary receipt, as of July 2003.  I also source a list of direct 
listings, for which the legal requirements of cross listing are essentially the same as those for exchange-listed 
depositary receipts from the official website of the NYSE and NASDAQ.  For firms with joint and simultaneous 
depositary receipt listings (Level 1/Portal Programs) I classify these firms as Level 1 programs.  If a firm has 
multiple depositary receipt programs, with different start dates, I classify this firm according to its earliest 
depositary receipt program, and ignore any subsequent programs.  Finally, I include on sponsored depositary 
receipt programs. 
        To be included in the final sample, I only include those firms for which data relating to both variants of 
our dependent variable is available, and exclude firms with either, missing (entirely) pre or post listing dividend 
payout data.  This ‘Narrow’ sample approach is necessary to ensure that any conclusions that I make are not due 
to a significant change in our sample makeup around the cross-listing date.  I obtain the non-cross listed sample 
from the country lists provided by Datastream.  From each, I exclude all firms with a U.S. listing, and include 
only those firms in our sample with data available on all our control variables.  Like Liu (2002), but unlike LLSV 
(2000), I include firms from countries with mandatory dividend requirements (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and 
Greece).  Finally, I exclude all financial firms.   
 Finally, I exclude certain observations due to probable data errors; negative net sales or revenues, 
negative market-to-book assets, and negative dividends paid.  In common with LLSV (2000), and Liu (2002), I 
eliminate possible outliers in our dependent variable(s) by removing the top 1% of outliers.  Due to possible 
errors in scaling the data with net sale or revenues, I also eliminate outliers from each of our covariates by 
eliminating the top and bottom 1% of observations. 
 After imposing these requirements, my final sample, outlined in detail in Table 1 is comprised of 3,418 
firms from 40 countries: 496 trade in the U.S., either as depositary receipts or directly on U.S. Exchanges.  The 
remaining 2,922 firms are non-cross-listed.  I provide, the percentage that each country (i.e. number of firms) 
contributes to the total number of firms in each depositary receipt level, and in each non-cross-listed sample.  
 7
For example, my non-cross-listed sample is dominated firms from Brazil (7.60%), Japan (23.41%) and the United 
Kingdom (11.02%).  In contrast, 18 countries contribute less than 1% each of our non-cross-listed sample.  The 
majority of Level 1 issues are from Hong Kong (13.25%), the United Kingdom (11.54%), Australia (5.98%), 
Brazil (5.56%), India (5.56%) and South Africa (5.13%).  Firms from the U.K. (20.69%), France (6.90%) and 
Japan (6.90%) dominate the exchange-traded sample. Non-surprisingly, the vast majority of direct listings in the 
U.S. are Canadian firms (97.37%).  Finally, India (26.00%) and Taiwan (20.00%) make up the majority of firms 
that trade on the Portal under Rule 144a. 
 I begin by reporting some summary payout measures for both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.  
The results are presented in Table 2.  For both variants of our dependent variable (Dividends-to-earnings and 
Dividends-to-cashflow), I calculate mean and median payout ratios over the full sample period.  I outline 
summary measures for all cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, and then further sub-divide the representative 
categories into firms originating from both high and low investor protection countries.  Firms are characterised 
as either high or low investor protection firms according to their countries anti-directors right index (See LLSV 
(1998)).   
 At this point it is important that I make the distinction between payout ratios in calendar as opposed to 
event time.   In Figures 1-12, I plot the time series behaviour of all firms in calendar time (which are averaged 
over the sample period and presented in Table 2).  Consequently, any interpretations made subsequently concern 
the level of the divided payout, and not changes in dividend payout that results from changes in domestic 
investor protection.  In the next section, I examine the change in dividend payout, resulting from a hypothesised 
change in domestic investor protection.  The relationship around the event date may be very different to the 
relationship that holds in calendar time.  Consequently, I may find support in favour of both the outcome and 
substitution models of dividends: the outcome model in calendar time, and the substitution model in event time.  
Liu (2002) provides similar arguments in her paper.      
 First, Level 1 firm’s payout a higher percentage of their earnings as dividends than both exchange-listed 
and Rule 144a firms in calendar time (as opposed to event time).  Second, non-cross-listed firms also pay out 
more dividends than both exchange-listed firms and Rule 144a firms, but pay slightly less (in terms of median 
payout) than Level 1 firms.  These results are replicated when dividends-to-cashflow is employed as our 
dependent variable.  Interestingly, the earlier relations are largely replicated for Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a 
firms from both high and low investor protection countries.  The results for low investor countries are especially 
interesting.  They show that Level 1 firms pay higher dividends than both exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms.  
This result may be driven by anti-directors rights measure differences within the low investor protection class or 
it may point to a relation between firm-level governance and dividend payout.  To examine this issue further, I 
plot the time series behaviour of dividend-payout for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms over the full sample 
period.  The results are reported in Figures 1-12.  In Figures 1 and 2, I outline the time-series behaviour of 
dividend-payout by depositary receipt level.  In the remaining figures, I classify cross-listed firms in accordance 
with their depositary receipt level, and their host countries level of investor protection.  The Figures suggest that 
the findings from Table 2 are largely replicated in each cross-section.  For example, in almost every year, 
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dividend payouts are greater in those countries where investors are better protected.  When I separate firms by 
depositary receipt level, I show that this relationship is unaffected.  Finally, the earlier findings for Level 1 firms 
are replicated in Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10.  As before, Level 1 firms from high and low investor protection 
countries pay significantly higher dividends than their exchange-listed and Portal counterparts.  Consistent with 
LLSV (2000), dividend payout is increasing in the level of investor protection.  In addition to their findings, I 
show that this relationship has persisted over time.    
 Next I examine the change in median dividend payouts around the time of listing for each depositary 
receipt level by country in Tables 3 and 4.  For each variant of our dependent variable, I outline the median 
payout differential between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, pre and post-listing.  I repeat the analysis for 
Level 1 firms, Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms and for firms that trade under Rule144a on the Portal.  The 
significance of the median differential is calculated using the Mann-Whitney test statistic.  In addition, I present 
for each depositary receipt level, before-after estimates of the change in dividend payout.  This is outlined in the 
third sub-column for each depositary receipt level.   
 I begin by discussing the results using dividend-to-earnings as our dependent variable.  The aggregated 
payout ratios suggest that Level 1 firms pay slightly higher dividends, Level 2/3 firms pay lower dividends, and 
Rule 144a firms pay higher dividends, post-listing.  I find that of the 30 countries with Level 1 listings, exactly 
half pay lower dividends, post-listing (15/30), 40% pay higher dividends (12/30), and 10% remain unchanged 
(3/30).  I find that of the 28 countries with Level 2/3 issues, 57% (16/28) pay lower dividends post-listing, 11 of 
the 28 pay higher dividends and 1 remains unaltered.  Finally, for Rule 144a firms, 10 of 19 pay higher dividends, 
while 9/19 pay lower dividends, post-listing.  The results using dividend-to-cashflow (Table 4) mirrors those of 
dividend-to-earnings. For example, 14 of 28 pay lower dividends, while 13/28 pays higher dividends.  The 
conclusions for the whole sample are the same as those outlined when I employ dividend-to-earnings as our 
dependent variable. 
 In the next section I test the agency models of dividends in a dynamic setting by, allowing investor 
protection to change for at least a subset of our sample i.e. for Level 2/3 cross-listed firms.  I hypothesise that if 
cross listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the domestic investors of Level 2/3 listed firms; I 
should observe a change in ordinary dividend payout.    
 
4.  Econometric Specification 
 In this section I outline the empirical methodology.  I compare the change in ordinary dividend payout 
for cross-listed firms relative to non-cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date.  This is motivated by the fact 
that regulatory bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher.  By examining the changes in ordinary 
dividend payout, I seek to isolate the impact of cross listing by controlling for firm, industry and country level 
determinants of ordinary dividend payout.  Next, I allow this effect to vary across the different listing types using 
a simple dummy variable specification, and use this change in dividend payments made to ordinary shareholders 
to make inferences about how domestic investor protection has changed, post-listing.     
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 To estimate the effect of cross listing on the ordinary dividend payout of firms, the following regression 
specification is followed: 
 
it 0 it 1 1 it 2 it 3 it t i itdiv X OTC EXCH PORTAL= β + β + δ + δ + δ + γ + α + υ                           (1) 
it 0 it 1 1 it 2 it 3 it t i itdiv X OTC* AD EXCH* AD PORTAL * AD=β + β +δ +δ +δ + γ +α +υ                                 (2) 
 
Where itdiv  is the ordinary dividend payout of firm i in year t.  I employ two different measures of ordinary 
dividend payout.  First, I employ the traditional measure of dividend payout, dividends-to-earnings.  
it(Div /Earn)  is defined as ((Dividends per Share/Earnings per Share) * 100) .  The second measure, dividends-
to-cashflow it(Div /CF) is defined similarly. itOTC , itEXCH and itPORTAL  are dummy variables that identify 
whether an individual firm i is cross-listed in the United States at time t either as a Level 1, Level 2/3 depositary 
receipt, or under SEC Rule 144a on Portal.  1 2 3, ,δ δ δ are parameters to be estimated.  In the two-way fixed 
effects specification, these parameters estimate the ‘causal’ effect of cross listing on ordinary dividend payout 
within firms that change from not listing to listing i.e. the within estimates.  itX  is a vector of time-varying firm 
and time-invariant country level variables (rather than include country fixed effects).  tγ  are time fixed effects, 
and itυ  is a standard idiosyncratic disturbance term.  In Equation 2, I interact each depositary receipt dummy 
variable with the anti-director rights measure provided by LLSV (1998).  In this specification, AD is 1 if the firm 
originates in a country where investors are poorly protected (i.e. Anti Directors Rights <3).  This specification 
allows me to measure the governance effects of cross listing for firms from countries where the protection 
afforded to investors is poor.  The sign of the coefficients 1 2 3, ,δ δ δ  and the significance of such are ambiguous.  
The coefficients on OTC, Portal  should be insignificant in line with the predictions of the legal bonding 
hypothesis.  However, the sign of the coefficient for exchange-listed firms is less clear.  The reasoning is as 
follows: given the considerable underdevelopment of legal institutions in some countries (See LLSV (1998)), the 
prevailing wisdom suggests that the incremental investor protections from listing in the U.S. should thus on 
theoretical grounds be greater for these firms.  On the other hand, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004a) conclude 
that country and firm governance are actually complementary to one another.  As such, voluntary firm 
governance improvements are more effective in countries where country governance is already effective.  Mitton 
(2004) using a sample of emerging market firms finds additional support in favour of this proposition.  Thus, the 
incremental governance benefits of listing in the U.S. for ‘emerging market’ firms may not be as effective due to 
poor governance at home4.  iα  is unobserved firm level heterogeneity.  I test whether these effects should be 
treated as fixed or random by employing the standard Hausman (1978) test.  The results (along with the Mundlak 
(1978) test) suggest that both the itX and iα  are correlated i.e. it iCov(X ) 0α ≠ . Consequently, I estimate a two-
                                                 
4  In a similar vein, Kristian-Hope, Kang, and Zang (2005) document that firms domiciled in a low disclosure regime experience a smaller net 
benefit to listing on an organized exchange (relative to firms domiciled in high disclosure regimes).  The authors do not explore empirically the 
reasons for such, but they do suggest a number of possible explanations.  In connection, Khurana, Pereira, and Xiumin (2004) outline that 
developed market firms exhibit greater external financed firm growth, relative to emerging market firms, post-listing.      
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way fixed effects model outlined in Equations 1 and 2.  Tests adopted from Baum (2001), Drukker (2003) and 
Wiggins (2003) suggest that the idiosyncratic errors are not independent and identically distributed.  
Consequently in all specifications, the standard errors are robust to both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-
group correlation using Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm.  In addition to the tests outlined I also 
test for the presence of ‘Firm’ and ‘Time’ effects in the residuals by using the intuitive approach outlined in 
Petersen (2005).  These results suggest that in line with our prior expectations, the error term contains a large 
firm effect, but a smaller time effect, which is common in corporate finance panel data sets.  In the presence of 
such Petersen (2005) outlines the superiority of using Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm, given the 
inclusion of fixed time effects ( tγ )5 to control for contemporaneous correlation.    
 In my second empirical specification, I use a Tobit model to control for data censoring given that 
dividend payout is left censored at zero.  The results of the Hausman (1978) test suggest that the individual 
specific effects are correlated with the regressors.  Unlike the fixed effects model, it is impossible within the 
Tobit specification to eliminate the iα  by differencing them out.  Furthermore, the unobserved effects cannot 
be conditioned out of maximum likelihood.  Consequently, there exists no fixed effects Tobit model.  In order to 
overcome this I adopt the approach of Wooldridge (2002).  He shows that one can use a general Chamberlain 
(1984) style model by specifying the unobserved heterogeneity as a function of firm level means of included 
regressors, as specified by Mundlak (1978) so: 
T
i i i i it
s 1
1X a , where X X
T =
α = ζ + = ∑ .  The means of time-invariant 
regressors are excluded.  The firm level means are substituted into Equations 1 and 2 yielding the following: 
 
it 0 it 1 1 it 2 it 3 it i itdiv X OTC EXCH PORTAL X= β + β + δ + δ + δ + ζ + υ                                           (3) 
it 0 it 1 1 it 2 it 3 it i itdiv X OTC* AD EXCH* AD PORTAL * AD X=β + β +δ +δ +δ + ζ+υ                                     (4) 
 
 Equations 3 and 4 are estimated using Pooled Tobit (e.g., Wooldridge (2002)).  In all specifications the 
regression standard errors are robust to non-normality, heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-group correlation 
(e.g., Hardin (2005)).  I present results for the pooled Tobit model in Tables 5-6 and use the fixed effects 
estimates (unreported) to validate the results I report for the pooled Tobit model.   
     The vector of firm level controls, itX  includes the following: (1) firms investment opportunity set 
(market to book of assets) (e.g., Rozeff (1982)) (2) profitability of assets in place (ROE).  Return on Equity is 
calculated as earnings per share divided by book growth per share (3) firm size (Total Assets (Log)) (4) free cash 
flow (FCF), (e.g., Jensen (1986)) (5) operating and financial leverage (Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) and Debt), 
(e.g., Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)) and (6) earnings volatility (EPS) (e.g., Fama and French (2002a)) is 
calculated as the variance of the previous three years earnings per share.  To conserve space, in Tables 3.10-3.12 
                                                 
5 Absent appropriate adjustment of the standard errors, we show that the standard errors are consistently underestimated by as much as 200% 
for some of the regressors.    
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I present results using only MBA, size and profitability as firm-level controls.  The results are not affected when I 
include the remaining firm-level control variables6.     
  In Appendix 1, I outline correlation coefficients and deal explicitly with concerns relating to 
multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors.  The correlation coefficients are by and large of the 
correct sign.  For example, it(Div / Earn)  is positively related to profitability (ROE) and size, and negatively 
related to both volatility of earnings and growth opportunities (MBA).  Surprisingly, both it(Div / Earn)  and 
it(Div /CF)  are negatively related to free cash flow, although neither is significant.  The small variance inflation 
factors suggest that multicollinearity is not a significant problem in our data set.    
  I employ two country dummies to control for variations in dividend payout across legal regimes: a simple 
0/1 dummy for legal origin: 1 if the country employs common law, and 0 otherwise (civil law).  I also account for 
cross-country differences in investor protection; I classify those firms as firms from high investor protection 
countries if their anti-director score is equal to or greater than the median value of 3 (See LLSV (1998)).  I control 
for payout differences across industries by classifying each firm according to their primary standard industry 
classification code.  Hence, I form seven industry dummies; (1) agriculture, fishing, and forestry (2) mining and 
construction (3) manufacturing (4) transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services (5) wholesale 
and retail trade (6) services and (7) public administration.  I exclude all finance, insurance, and real estate firms (SIC 
beginning with 6). 
 I repeat the analysis by including American depositary receipt dividends as a covariate in each specification.  
ADR dividends are ordinary share dividends paid to the holders of ADRs, converted to U.S. Dollars at the 
prevailing spot exchange rate.  I have no prior beliefs on the sign of the coefficient.  For example, cross-listed firms 
with a history of paying dividends may also be those to pay a dividend to their ADR shareholders.  Furthermore, I 
find that the inclusion of ADR dividends does not alter my main conclusions.  All ADR dividend data is sourced 
from The Bank of New York (www.adrbny.com).  All variables employed in our empirical analysis are defined in 
Table 3.15.     
 
5.  Results 
 In Tables 5-8, I present the results estimating the effect of cross listing on the ordinary dividend payout of 
cross-listed firms.  In Tables 5 and 6, I present the pooled Tobit results corresponding to Equation 3 for 
Dividends-to-Earnings and Dividends-to-Cashflow, respectively.  In Tables 7 and 8, I employ interaction variables 
to assess the impact of cross listing on the dividend payout of firms originating from countries where minority 
investors are poorly protected.  In both tables, I outline regression results with the cross-listing dummies only 
(Column 1), the cross-listing dummies with firm level controls (2), and in (3) and (4) I include the ADR dummies 
and the firm level controls with country level governance variables.  In column (3), I employ the LLSV (1998) anti-
director rights measure, and in column (4) I include a dummy variable to signal if a firm is domiciled in a common 
                                                 
6 In unreported results, I calculate summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables by listing type.  The results are available 
from the author upon request.   
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law jurisdiction.  Both variables are expected to impact positively on dividend payout (e.g., LLSV (2000)).  These 
findings are robust to the inclusion of dividends to cashflow as our dependent variable.  In addition to reporting the 
coefficient estimates, I also report the marginal effects at the means of each variable.  For the dummy variables the 
marginal effects are calculated as the discrete change in F(x) as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.     
     The first major result from Table 5 is that exchange-listed firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-
listing.  This finding is robust to the inclusion of firm and country controls (and industry controls in the case of the 
pooled Tobit model).  This finding is important given that those firms that cross-list are very often those with 
sizable growth opportunities, proxied here by market to book of assets.  I show that even after including this 
control, exchange-listed firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing.  Thus this result is not driven by the 
sizable investment opportunity set of cross-listed firms.  This result is in line with the results reported by Mitton 
(2004) for a sample of emerging market cross-listed firms and suggests that firms substitute dividends for improved 
firm-level governance.  This result is also consistent with the findings of Liu (2002), who outline how functional 
convergence measures initiated are associated with lower dividend payouts.  This finding for Level 2/3 listed firms 
suggests that rather than compete with one another, the outcome and substitute models of dividends are not 
mutually exclusive.  Rather, this result suggests a role for both in explaining the relationship between investor 
protection and firm dividend payout.  Like Liu (2002), my results suggest that cross-sectional tests are biased 
towards an acceptance of the outcome model of dividends.  I find that the outcome model dominates in calendar 
time.  In contrast, I find that in event time firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance.       
 In all specifications, the country and firm level controls are highly significant and have the expected sign.  
For example, larger and profitable firms pay higher dividends, while firms with sizable growth opportunities retain a 
sizable amount of earnings, rather than pay dividends.  In line with my expectations, firms from common law 
countries with efficient legal and institutional frameworks pay significantly higher dividends (See LLSV (2000)).  
Finally, I also document that firms that pay an ADR dividend also pay larger dividends suggesting a possible 
clientele effect.   
 In Table 6, I examine the impact of cross listing on dividend policy for firms from countries with a poor 
record for protecting minority investors.  Comparing Tables 5 and 6 the results suggest that although the 
magnitudes of the Tobit estimates are broadly similar, their significance is not as strong when compared to the 
results in Table 5.  This suggests that the benefits to listing may not be as great for firms from poor-investor 
protection countries, consistent with the notion that firm and country governance improvements are in fact 
complementary to one another.   
     The results for Rule 144a firms are consistent with theory.  The results from Tables 5-6 suggest that 
cross listing in the U.S. confers no additional protection benefits for the ordinary shareholders of these firms.  In 
almost all specifications Rule 144a firms do not significantly change the amount that they pay to their ordinary 
shareholders.  The results for Level 1 firms are very interesting.  In all regression specifications these firms pay 
significantly lower dividends, post-listing, a result consistent with the notion that like exchange-listed firms, these 
firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance.  However, this result warrants further discussion.  Level 1 
firms are exempt from becoming ‘reporting’ companies under the terms of their depositary receipt agreement.  
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Consequently, our finding that these firms pay sizable and significantly lower dividends post-listing is 
inconsistent with any of the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis.  In the next sub-section I attempt to 
shed more light on this finding. 
 I report in Tables 7 and 8 our regression results using Dividends-to-Cashflow as our dependent variable.  
The results are largely in line with those outlined when I employ Dividends-to-Earnings.  
 
6. Firm-Level Governance 
 The findings for Level 1 firms may be consistent with the notion of reputational bonding: both KS 
(2004) and Siegel (2004) document that even absent effective legal bonding, a firm can still voluntarily bond 
themselves to fair treatment of their minority investors7.  In addition, the evidence from Section 3 suggests that 
Level 1 firms, from both strong and weak investor protection countries, establish a strong reputation for the 
protection of investors by paying a greater proportion of their earnings as dividends, relative to both exchange-
listed and Portal firms, and this relation holds in the pre and post-listing periods.  Consequently, the ability of 
Level 1 issues to pay lower dividends post-listing may result from voluntary measures initiated by them post-
listing e.g. firm level governance improvements (e.g., DK (2005)) and/or as a direct result of their reputation for 
fair treatment of minority shareholders.  In fact Pinegar and Ravichandran (2004, p.8) in their study of Rule 
144a/Reg S firms suggest as much when they conclude, “the reputation of the issuer may be as important as 
ownership concentration or the legal environment in protecting minority shareholders rights”.  The valuation 
premiums that Level 1 firms generate post-listing are also consistent with the notion that some of these firms 
benefit from reputational bonding, post-listing (e.g., Durand, Tan, and Tarca (2005)).  Consistent with this 
argument, Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005, p. 2942) conclude in their study of U.S. Institutional Investor 
foreign portfolio allocations “U.S. funds allocate a larger proportion of their assets to firms with listed ADRs and 
unlisted ADRs that have better accounting and disclosure policies. Unlisted ADR firms have higher allocations 
only when they also adopt high quality accounting disclosures”.   
 To examine whether non-exchange listed firms (Level 1 and Rule 144a) voluntarily commit to bond 
themselves to fair treatment of their minority shareholders through improved firm-level governance, I proxy for 
firm-level governance using the number of closely held shares and examine its behaviour around a cross-listing.  
A fall in the number of closely held shares implies an improvement in firm-level governance.  Numerous papers 
have employed closely held shares to proxy for firm-level governance (e.g. Holland and Warnock (2003)).  From 
my original sample of 496 cross-listed firms, I am able to source data on Closely Held Shares for 214 Level 1 
firms, 137 Level 2/3 (including ordinary lists) and 49 Rule 144a firms from Worldscope.  The results are outlined 
in Table 9.   
 Here I outline for each depositary receipt level, the median value of closely held shares in the two years 
prior to listing, and on the list year.  In the subsequent rows, I calculate the change in closely held shares between 
                                                 
7 Reputational bonding refers to bonding as a result of increased monitoring from reputational intermediaries e.g. analysts, underwriters, and 
auditors.  A large literature suggests that it is only exchange-traded firms that benefit from reputational bonding after listing in the U.S. (e.g. 
LLM (2003)).  Consequently, firm level improvements for non-exchange traded firms are more likely to be driven by voluntary initiatives on 
the part of the firm.    
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the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the two years pre-listing (-2, -1).  For example, Δ (3, -1) refers 
to the change in closely held shares one year prior to listing to three years post-listing.  In the case of Level 1 
firms this change is negative, implying an improvement in firm-level governance.  In the remaining rows, I 
outline the median value of closely held shares in the pre and post-listing period.  The difference is outlined in 
the final row.   
 I begin by discussing the results for Level 1 firms.  My findings suggest that non-exchange listed Level 1 
firms improve their firm level governance in the post-listing period.  The number of shares closely held is lower 
in almost every period post-listing, relative to the two years pre-listing.  For example, the number of shares 
closely held by Level 1 firms is almost 33% lower three years post-listing relative to the year prior to listing.  I 
find the opposite for Rule 144a firms; in every period post-listing, I find that the level of closely held shares is 
greater than in the pre-listing period (column 4).  Interestingly, the results for both Level 1 and Rule 144a firms 
are consistent with our findings reported in Section 3: Level 1 firms consistently pay higher dividends relative to 
both Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms, and Rule 144a firms.  As such these firms establish a reputation for fair 
treatment of their investors by paying out a sizable proportion of their earnings as dividends.  Interestingly, the 
results for Level 2/3 exchange listed firms are mixed.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 The ability of firms to finance their investment opportunity set externally is largely contingent on the 
effectiveness of their domestic legal system to protect the interests of their minority shareholders.  In a country 
characterised by poor legal protection of investors, firms are very often constrained in their attempts to fund 
their growth opportunities.  To rectify this, a number of firms have over the last decade sought to substitute their 
home level governance for the superior governance of the U.S. by listing on an organised U.S. exchange.  RW 
(2002) document that post-listing, exchange-listed ADRs, capitally constrained at home pre-listing, were no 
longer post-listing.  This suggests that the domestic investors of these investors are better protected post-listing.  
I test this proposition. 
 In order to do so I employ the agency models of dividends introduced by LLSV (2000).  I examine the 
ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms around a cross listing in the U.S.  The choice of variable is motivated 
by the fact that (1) dividend payout is increasing in the level of investor protection and, consequently (2) changes in 
external investor protection are associated with changes in firm dividend payout, controlling for firm, industry and 
country level determinants of dividend payout.  I hypothesis that if the investors of exchange-listed firms are better 
protected, they are more likely to accept lower dividends.  I argue that ordinary shareholders are compensated for 
this reduced dividend payment with enhanced protection.   
 Using a sample of 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries, I show that exchange-listed firms pay 
significantly lower dividends post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of firm, industry and country 
controls.  This result is consistent with the notion that these investors are better protected under the U.S. regime.  
In line with my expectations I find no evidence that the ordinary shareholders of Rule 144a firms benefit from 
incremental protection, post-listing.  Interestingly, my results suggest that the minority investors of Level 1 firms 
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are better protected.  Although inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, I show that these firms 
consistently establish a reputation for better protection of their investors by paying out a greater proportion of 
their earnings as dividends.  Consequently, their ability to pay lower dividends post-list may well result from a 
voluntary commitment on the part of these firm to protect their investors that is credible given their reputation 
for fair treatment.  I present evidence to suggest that these firms improve their firm level governance post-listing.  
The payment of substantially higher dividends by these firms suggests a commitment on their part to bond to 
fair treatment of their ordinary shareholders.   
 Finally, my findings outline the importance of testing the agency models of dividends both cross-
sectionally, and across time.  Like Liu (2002), I find empirical support for both models; dividend payouts are larger 
in countries where investors are better protected.  In addition I show that this relationship has persisted over time.  
Second, and consistent with the findings of Liu (2002), I show that governance reforms are associated with lower 
firm dividend payouts.  Liu’s (2002) findings suggest that country functional convergence reforms (as opposed to 
legal reforms) substitute for dividends in controlling the agency costs associated with free cash flow.  My findings 
suggest that governance reforms initiated at the level of the firm, and not the country, are effective reforms.  This 
suggests that cross listing in the U.S. does enhance the protection of the domestic investors of those firms that list.   
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Table 1: Sample Description 
Country NCL % Level 1 % Level 2/3 % Rule 144a % Ordinary % Total CL Sample 
Argentina 17 0.58 0 0.00 5 2.87 0 0.00 0 0.00 5 22 
Australia 86 2.94 14 5.98 8 4.60 1 2.00 0 0.00 23 109 
Austria 23 0.79 9 3.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 9 32 
Belgium 22 0.75 2 0.85 1 0.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 25 
Brazil 222 7.60 13 5.56 7 4.02 1 2.00 0 0.00 21 243 
Canada 112 3.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 37 97.37 37 149 
Chile 25 0.86 0 0.00 4 2.30 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 29 
China 22 0.75 3 1.28 5 2.87 0 0.00 0 0.00 8 30 
Colombia 25 0.86 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.00 0 0.00 1 26 
Denmark 33 1.13 0 0.00 1 0.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 34 
Finland 31 1.06 4 1.71 3 1.72 1 2.00 0 0.00 8 39 
France 134 4.59 12 5.13 12 6.90 0 0.00 0 0.00 24 158 
Germany 129 4.41 8 3.42 7 4.02 2 4.00 0 0.00 17 146 
Greece 17 0.58 1 0.43 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 18 
Hong Kong 65 2.22 31 13.25 3 1.72 2 4.00 0 0.00 36 101 
India 46 1.57 13 5.56 6 3.45 13 26.00 0 0.00 32 78 
Ireland 20 0.68 2 0.85 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 22 
Israel 66 2.26 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 66 
Italy 51 1.75 6 2.56 8 4.60 1 2.00 0 0.00 15 66 
Japan 684 23.41 15 6.41 12 6.90 1 2.00 0 0.00 28 712 
Malaysia 66 2.26 4 1.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 70 
Mexico 33 1.13 4 1.71 11 6.32 1 2.00 0 0.00 16 49 
Netherlands 19 0.65 5 2.14 8 4.60 0 0.00 0 0.00 13 32 
Norway 22 0.75 4 1.71 3 1.72 1 2.00 0 0.00 8 30 
New Zealand 34 1.16 1 0.43 1 0.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 36 
Peru 56 1.92 0 0.00 1 0.57 2 4.00 0 0.00 3 59 
Phillipines 22 0.75 4 1.71 0 0.00 1 2.00 0 0.00 5 27 
Poland 63 2.16 3 1.28 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 66 
Portugal 29 0.99 1 0.43 2 1.15 1 2.00 0 0.00 4 33 
Russia 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.57 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1 
South Africa 23 0.79 12 5.13 5 2.87 2 4.00 0 0.00 19 42 
Singapore 66 2.26 10 4.27 0 0.00 1 2.00 0 0.00 11 77 
South Korea 44 1.51 5 2.14 5 2.87 4 8.00 0 0.00 14 58 
Spain 83 2.84 1 0.43 3 1.72 1 2.00 0 0.00 5 88 
Sweden 28 0.96 2 0.85 7 4.02 1 2.00 0 0.00 10 38 
Switzerland 7 0.24 2 0.85 4 2.30 2 4.00 0 0.00 8 15 
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Country NCL % Level 1 % Level 2/3 % Rule 144a % Ordinary % Total CL Sample 
Taiwan 27 0.92 8 3.42 5 2.87 10 20.00 0 0.00 23 50 
Thailand 28 0.96 8 3.42 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 8 36 
Turkey 120 4.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 120 
UK 322 11.02 27 11.54 36 20.69 0 0.00 1 2.63 64 386 
TOTAL 2,922 100% 234 100% 174 100% 50 100% 38 100% 496 3,418 
In this table I outline the final sample by country and cross-listing level.  N (NCL) is the number of firms by country not cross-listed in the United States.  All information on firms 
cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank.  Rule 144a ADRs trade on 
PORTAL; Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2/3 trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ.  Ordinary Shares are shares that list directly in the United 
States. 
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Table 2: Dividend Payout Levels by ADR Classification (Mean [Median]) 
In this table I report mean and median dividend payout levels for non-cross-listed firms and cross-listed firms over 
the full sample period.  Dividends-to-cashflow and dividends-to-earnings are employed as our payout proxies.  
Both are defined in the appendix.  Dividend payouts for all cross-listed firms are calculated over the full sample 
period for each firm, which includes both the pre and post-listing period.  For both cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms I report both t and Z statistics for the mean and median difference between high and low investor 
protection countries, respectively.  *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.    
 
 Domestic Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
Dividends-to-Earnings 
 
Full Sample 38.00 
[30.29] 
35.92 
[32.98] 
32.20 
[25.31] 
34.64 
[27.56] 
Low Anti-Director 35.55 
[29.84] 
31.73 
[30.94] 
32.89 
[31.35] 
33.48 
[18.25] 
High Anti-Director 39.05 
[30.53] 
 
35.92 
[32.85] 
31.61 
[22.56] 
32.17 
[23.62] 
Dividends-to-Cashflow 
 
Full Sample 
 
20.42 
[14.21] 
20.22 
[18.34] 
16.14 
[11.89] 
17.69 
[13.00] 
Low Anti-Director 
 
16.46 
[11.69] 
14.95 
[13.13] 
13.88 
[12.22] 
8.28 
[5.46] 
High Anti-Director 
 
21.66 
[14.93] 
20.84 
[18.23] 
16.42 
[11.31] 
18.54 
[13.90] 
     
Significance Tests [High vs. Low] 
 
Dividends-to-Earnings 
 
Mean -3.23*** -2.54** 0.42 0.0215 
Median -6.93*** -2.22** 2.73*** -0.554 
Dividends-to-Cashflow 
 
Mean -15.88*** -8.89*** -4.61*** -3.87*** 
Median -16.26*** -6.94*** -0.765 -4.43*** 
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Table 3: Median Dividends-to-Earnings payout differentials. 
Country Cross-List Cross-List Level 1 OTC Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 CL-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre 
Argentina 71.48*** 83.19*** 69.53*** - - - 83.19*** 69.53*** (13.66) - - - 
Australia (12.79)*** (19.7)*** (7.68)*** (12.83)*** (5.42)*** 7.41 (26.76)*** (13.18)*** 13.58 (60.24)*** (9.37) 50.87 
Austria (5.15) (5.12) (6.35) (5.12) (6.35) (1.23) - - - - - - 
Belgium 7.62** 3.30 14.55** 2.41 13.70** 11.29 6.72 29.74 23.02 - - - 
Brazil 8.58*** 6.14* 9.88*** 7.17 8.73*** 1.56 4.72 16.41** 11.69 - (18.18) - 
Canada (9.48)*** (3.93) (18.46)*** - - - (3.93) (18.46)*** (14.53) - - - 
Chile 6.73 17.31* 3.23 - - - 17.31* 3.23 (14.08) - - - 
China (19.08)** (38.1)*** (9.51) (15.20) (38.08) (22.88) (38.08)*** (5.39) 32.69 - - - 
Colombia 30.07 (38.46) 33.10 - - - - - - (38.46) 33.10 71.56 
Denmark (3.01) 2.64 (3.09) - - - 2.64 (3.09) (5.73) - - - 
Finland (1.74) (5.96)* 5.12* (3.85) 8.38* 12.23 (7.28)* (2.14) 5.14 (12.31) 4.22 16.53 
France 0.79*** (0.48)** 3.78 1.76 7.64** 5.88 (3.78)*** (14.56)*** (10.78) - - - 
Germany (7.06)*** (5.84)*** (11.92)*** (6.60)* (11.45)** (4.85) (3.70) (12.82)** (9.12) (44.08)*** (10.65)* 33.43 
Greece (19.88)*** (19.9)*** (49.11)*** (19.88)*** (49.11)*** (29.23) - - - - - - 
Hong Kong 0.89 6.10** (5.46) 7.76*** (3.86) (11.62) (18.27) (22.63) (4.36) (40.24)*** (40.24)*** - 
India (3.52)*** (4.95)*** (2.99)** 0.54 (0.89) (1.43) (12.72)*** (17.31)*** (4.59) 4.11 (3.52) (7.63) 
Ireland (26.32)*** (26.3)*** (26.32)*** (26.32)*** (26.32)*** - - - - - - - 
Israel - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Italy (1.53) (6.96)** (0.95) (34.84)*** (2.45) 32.39 10.28 1.33 (8.95) (20.89)*** (24.60)*** (3.71) 
Japan (2.60)*** (0.65) (4.88)*** (1.25) 0.93 2.18 0.19 (10.93)*** (11.12) 11.74 (12.95)** (24.69) 
Malaysia (3.56) (2.10) (7.80) (2.10) (7.80) (5.70) - - - - - - 
Mexico 6.43*** 6.43** 6.22** 14.54*** 35.77*** 21.23 0.55 4.27 3.72 13.21 9.65** (3.56) 
Netherlands (2.26)*** (2.87)*** (1.69)** (0.53) (2.50) (1.97) (3.35)*** (1.48)** 1.87 - - - 
Norway 31.52*** 21.76*** 36.58*** 33.22*** 35.48*** 2.26 - 50.93*** - 15.07*** 32.86*** 17.79 
New Zealand 28.36 36.41* (48.00) (48.00)*** (48.00)*** 0.00 45.68*** 30.92 (14.76) - - - 
Peru 44.75*** 32.14 45.07*** - - - 38.53 44.75** 6.22 22.21 58.42*** 36.21 
Phillipines 3.46 0.00 6.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - 5.95 7.89** 1.94 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - - 0.00 - 
Portugal 14.59 (6.00) 17.23** (14.65)* (19.05) (4.40) 16.04 14.88* (1.16) 9.79 23.00*** 13.21 
Russia - - - - - - 0.00 13.16 13.16 - 0.00 - 
South Africa (1.62)*** 0.31 (4.23)*** (3.26)*** (5.99)*** (2.73) 8.32*** (3.73) (12.05) (17.56)*** (1.05) 16.51 
Singapore (6.86)** (1.21) (7.75)*** (0.94) (6.98)*** (6.04) - - - (11.73) (15.12)** (3.39) 
South Korea (1.42) 12.49*** (11.04)*** 9.65*** (13.78)*** (23.43) 6.88 (7.76) (14.64) 18.27 (0.56) (18.83) 
Spain 9.69** 15.98*** 8.27 (18.62) (33.58)** (14.96) 18.99*** 9.66 (9.33) 3.58 (10.14) (13.72) 
Sweden (0.36) 6.67* (3.26)*** 12.86 1.64 (11.22) 5.70** (4.95)*** (10.65) (33.87)** 1.18 35.05 
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Country Cross-List Cross-List Level 1 OTC Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 CL-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre 
Switzerland 17.88*** 17.30*** 18.52*** 21.15*** 21.37*** 0.22 5.12** 16.50*** 11.38 7.54*** 2.85 (4.69) 
Taiwan (22.00)** (22.00)** (22.00)** (22.00) 0.56 22.56 (22.00)*** (22.00)*** 0.00 19.08*** (13.16) (32.24) 
Thailand (14.53)*** (5.38)** (17.68)*** (5.38)** (17.68)*** (12.30) - - - - - - 
Turkey - - - - - - - - - - - - 
UK 1.64*** (0.93)*** 6.36 (0.43)*** 7.75 8.18 (1.16)*** 3.97** 5.13 - - - 
TOTAL 0.65*** 1.23 (0.02)*** 3.23*** 3.67** 0.44 (0.17)*** (5.03)*** (4.86) (6.71)*** (3.14)*** 3.57 
In this table, I calculate for each ADR Level the Median dividend payout difference between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms, in both the pre and post-listing period.  Dividend-to-Earnings is 
employed as our payout proxy, and is defined in the appendix.  Furthermore, I outline for each ADR Level the difference in dividend payouts, pre and post-listing.  I test the equality of medians 
between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using the Mann-Whitney test (Z-Statistic).  *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  All firm level data is sourced 
from Worldscope and Datastream.  All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP 
Morgan and Citibank.  Rule 144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2/3 trade on U.S. exchanges.   
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Table 4: Median Dividends-to-Cashflow payout differentials. 
 Cross-List Cross-List Level 1 OTC Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 CL-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre 
Argentina 19.35*** 25.40* 18.29*** - - - 25.40* 18.29*** (7.11) - - - 
Australia (14.78)*** (20.1)*** (12.57)*** (17.65)*** (11.82)*** 5.83 (18.92)*** (12.85)*** 6.07 (36.31)*** (20.34)** 15.97 
Austria 2.94*** (0.30) 6.45*** (0.30) 6.45*** 6.75 - - - - - - 
Belgium 0.98* (0.02) 6.35** 1.46 7.36*** 5.90 (0.41) (5.78) (5.37) - - - 
Brazil 6.02*** 4.05 6.45*** 4.62 6.37*** 1.75 3.48 8.79** 5.31 - (4.21) - 
Canada (4.22)*** (1.87) (7.57)*** - -  (1.87) (7.57)*** (5.70) - - - 
Chile (0.32) 26.43** (6.42) - -  26.43** (6.42) (32.85) - - - 
China (10.95)** (15.9)*** (1.09) 0.00 (15.9) (15.9) (15.9)*** 0.44 16.33 - - - 
Colombia 3.69 (29.04) 4.68 - - - - - - (29.04) 4.68  
Denmark 2.21 5.99 1.95 - (9.95) - 5.99 1.95 (4.04) - - - 
Finland (0.65) (4.00)*** 2.34 (7.90)** 0.22 8.12 (4.65)* 7.46** 12.11 (0.98) (0.06) 0.92 
France (1.65)*** (2.50)*** 0.39 (0.53) 2.87 3.40 (4.31)*** (10.10)*** (5.79) - - - 
Germany (3.00)*** (3.02)*** (2.40)* (5.87)*** (5.39)*** 0.48 (0.77) 5.48* 6.25 (13.04)*** (5.55) 7.49 
Greece (14.23)* - (14.23)* - (14.23)* - - - - - - - 
Hong Kong (3.24)* 1.48 (5.93)*** 3.23 (4.98)** (8.21) (23.16)*** (30.22)*** (7.06) (27.38)*** (21.83)* 5.55 
India (3.07)*** (5.17)*** (2.28)*** (5.12)*** (0.61) 4.51 (7.42)*** (9.54)*** (2.12) (1.16) (2.79)*** (1.63) 
Ireland (19.42)*** (19.4)*** (19.42)*** (19.42)*** (19.42)*** 0.00 - - - - - - 
Israel - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Italy (0.52) (5.81)*** 2.08 (6.47)*** 4.27* 10.74 (3.92)*** 1.92* 5.84 (7.41)*** (9.52)*** (2.11) 
Japan (0.46)* 0.81** (3.29)*** 0.93*** (0.46) (1.39) 0.82 (4.84)*** (5.66) (0.13) (0.67) (0.54) 
Malaysia (1.98)* (0.69) (2.93)* (0.69) (2.93)* (2.24) - - - - - - 
Mexico 10.08*** 9.78*** 10.23*** 20.14*** 20.44*** 0.30 8.22* 7.53* (0.69) 12.48 9.38* (3.10) 
Netherlands (4.06)*** (4.06)*** (4.08)*** (2.87)*** 3.23 6.10 (5.43)*** (7.02)*** (1.59) - - - 
Norway 22.73*** 16.01*** 24.19*** 20.07*** 26.36*** 6.29 7.78 15.52*** 7.74 - (9.35) - 
New Zealand 2.20 25.38 (16.69)* (27.17)*** (27.17)*** 0.00 29.03*** (3.48) (32.51) - - - 
Peru 11.82*** 4.07 16.27*** - - - 2.75 14.72* 11.97 5.38 32.23*** 26.85 
Philippines 2.43 0.00 4.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - 5.68 6.94** 1.26 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - - - - 
Portugal 5.60* (0.80) 7.90** (5.77) (13.17) (7.40) (3.26) 5.86** 9.12 12.66 13.23** 0.57 
Russia - - - - - - - - - - - - 
South Africa (5.46)*** (3.37)** (7.21)*** (6.70)*** (7.18)*** (0.48) 12.67*** (7.07)* (19.74) (22.36)*** (11.88)*** 10.48 
Singapore (9.96)*** (8.30)** (10.00)*** (5.75)* (9.85)*** (4.10) - - - (12.83)* (14.75)*** (1.92) 
South Korea (1.63) 4.25*** (2.72)*** 0.89* (4.08)*** (4.97) 2.05 (1.49) (3.54) 6.37** (4.20)*** (10.57) 
Spain (2.34) (1.89) (4.65)** (7.89) (17.69)*** (9.80) (1.99) (0.12) 1.87 13.30 (7.52) (20.82) 
 26
 Cross-List Cross-List Level 1 OTC Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 CL-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre Pre-NCL Post-NCL Post-Pre 
Sweden (2.32)*** (1.80)* (2.32)*** 1.90 (2.35) (4.25) (3.86) (3.36)*** 0.50 (19.84)** 5.95 25.79 
Switzerland 11.30*** 8.83*** 12.78*** 14.60*** 14.21*** (0.39) 6.18*** 12.10** 5.92 2.65 12.95*** 10.30 
Taiwan (17.06)*** (17.06)** (17.06)** (17.06)** (5.29) 11.77 (17.06)** (17.06)** 0.00 19.93*** (4.71) (24.64) 
Thailand (5.66) (3.64) (8.85) (3.64) (8.85) (5.21) - - - - - - 
Turkey - - - - - - - - - - - - 
UK (1.68)*** (5.16)*** 1.89 (4.85)*** 3.38 8.23 (5.51)*** 0.41** 5.92 - - - 
TOTAL 0.57*** (0.01)** 1.31* 1.63*** 4.46*** 2.83 (1.36)*** (1.80)*** (0.44) (3.72)*** (1.41)** 2.31 
In this table, I calculate for each ADR Level the Median dividend payout difference between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms, in both the pre and post-listing period.  Dividend-to-Cashflow 
is employed as our payout proxy, and is defined in the appendix.  Furthermore, I outline for each ADR Level the difference in dividend payouts, pre and post-listing.  I test the equality of medians 
between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms using the Mann-Whitney test (Z-Statistic).  *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  All firm level data is sourced 
from Worldscope and Datastream.  All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP 
Morgan and Citibank.  Rule 144a issues trade as private placements on PORTAL; Level 1 firms trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2/3 trade on U.S. exchanges.   
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Table 5: Tobit analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms – Dividend-to-Earnings 
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit 
  [1] dy dx/  [2] dy dx/  [3] dy dx/  [4] dy dx/  
OTC 
 
+/- -1.22 
[-0.59] 
-0.6742 
 
-9.28 
[-4.2]*** 
-5.12 -9.25 
[-4.2]*** 
-5.10 -10.57 
[-4.8]*** 
-5.79 
EXCH 
 
+/- -7.38 
[-2.4]** 
-3.93 -19.96 
[-5.4]*** 
-10.32 -19.84 
[-5.3]*** 
-10.27 -20.07 
[-5.5]*** 
-10.38 
PORTAL 
 
+/- -0.78 
[-0.15] 
-0.43 -8.16 
[-1.56] 
-4.51 -8.61 
[-1.60] 
-4.74 -9.15 
[-1.71]* 
-5.03 
Intercept 
 
 24.56 
[5.44]*** 
- -41.37 
[-10]*** 
- -44.17 
[-5.3]*** 
- -45.86 
[-5.6]*** 
- 
MBA 
 
- - - -0.67 
[-4.3]*** 
-0.39 -0.67 
[-4.3]*** 
-0.38 -0.69 
[-4.4]*** 
-0.40 
ROE 
 
+ - - 0.06 
[2.1]** 
0.036 0.06 
[2.1]** 
0.037 0.06 
[2.2]** 
0.032 
Log(Total Asset) 
 
+ - - 6.32 
[4.55]*** 
3.66 6.29 
[6.46]*** 
3.65 6.12 
[6.38]*** 
3.58 
ADR Dividend 
 
+/- - - 16.71 
[5.4]*** 
10.65 16.59 
[5.26]*** 
10.56 16.85 
[5.38]*** 
10.75 
Anti-Director 
 
+ - - - - 5.63 
[3.77]*** 
3.19 - - 
Common Law 
 
+ - - - - - - 5.65 
[4.28]*** 
3.32 
          
Industry Effects  Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Time Effects  No - No - No - No - 
Observations  29691 - 21116 - 21116 - 21116 - 
Censored Obs  5541 - 3312 - 3312 - 3312 - 
Log Likelihood 
 
 -131195 - -94759 - -94734 - -94724 - 
          
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the effect of cross listing on the ordinary 
dividend payouts of cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date.  Dividends-to-Earnings is employed as the dependent 
variable.  The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 countries over the 
period from 1990-2002.  Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and are defined in the 
Appendix.  Country controls are also defined in the appendix.  In each specification I report results for firms trading in the U.S. 
either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR [EXCH], or on the Portal under Rule 
144a [PORTAL].  *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  The pooled Tobit standard errors are 
robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group 
correlations.   Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit.  In columns 1-4 I include but do not report the estimates of the firm level 
means.  In all but one specification, an F-Test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level.  The marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of the independent variables.  For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete 
change in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.  
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Table 6: Tobit Analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms by legal origin – Dividend-to-Earnings. 
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit 
  [1] dy dx/  [2] dy dx/  [3] dy dx/  [4] dy dx/  
OTC*AD 
 
+/- -5.60 
[-1.31] 
-3.01 -11.11 
[-2.47]** 
-6.03 -7.11 
[-1.53] 
-3.95 
 
-10.37 
[-2.2]** 
-5.66 
EXCH*AD 
 
+/- -6.45 
[-1.22] 
-3.44 -22.42 
[-3.2]*** 
-11.34 -18.41 
[-2.6]*** 
-9.54 -21.09 
[-3.0]*** 
-10.76 
PORTAL*AD 
 
+/- 8.62 
[0.74] 
4.90 1.03 
[0.16] 
0.60 4.96 
[0.77] 
2.97 1.99 
[0.342] 
1.17 
Intercept 
 
 25.38 
[5.63]*** 
- -20.30 
[-4.6]*** 
- -22.27 
[-0.82] 
- -25.91 
[-0.95] 
- 
MBA 
 
- - - -0.66 
[-4.3]*** 
-0.39 -0.66 
[-4.2]*** 
-0.39 -0.68 
[-4.3]*** 
-0.39 
ROE 
 
+ - - 0.06 
[2.04]** 
0.035 0.06 
[2.3]** 
0.035 0.06 
[2.3]** 
0.032 
Log(Total Asset) 
 
+ - - 5.65 
[5.84]*** 
3.28 5.63 
[5.81]*** 
3.27 5.51 
[5.71]*** 
3.19 
ADR Dividend 
 
+/- - - 8.48 
[2.85]*** 
5.16 7.85 
[2.63]*** 
4.76 7.76 
[2.63]** 
4.71 
Anti-Director 
 
+ - - - - 4.71 
[3.02]*** 
2.68 - - 
Common Law 
 
+ - - - - - - 4.85 
[3.69]*** 
2.84 
          
Industry Effects  Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes  
Time Effects  No - No - No - No  
Observations  29691 - 21116 - 21116 - 21116  
Censored Obs  5541 - 3312 - 3312 - 3312  
Log Likelihood 
 
 -131210 - -94820 - -94804 - -94794  
          
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the effect of cross listing on the ordinary 
dividend payouts of cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date.  Dividends-to-Earnings are employed as the dependent 
variable.  The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 countries over 
the period from 1990-2002.  Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and are defined in the 
Appendix.  Country controls are also defined in the appendix.  In each specification I report results for firms trading in the 
U.S. either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR [EXCH], or on the Portal 
under Rule 144a [PORTAL].  In this specification I interact the ADR Dummies with an investor rights measure developed 
by LLSV [1998].  The ADR measure is 1 if the firm is domiciled in a country where investors are poorly protected [AD<3].  
*, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  The pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-
normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group 
correlations.   Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit.  In columns 1-4 I include but do not report the estimates of the firm 
level means.  In all but one specification, an F-Test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level. .  For the 
dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 
1.       
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Table 7: Tobit Analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms – Dividend-to-Cashflow. 
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit 
  [1] dy dx/  [2] dy dx/  [3] dy dx/  [4] dy dx/  
OTC 
 
+/- 1.91 
[1.63] 
1.08 -0.18 
[-0.15] 
-0.1065 
 
-0.21 
[-0.18] 
-0.1254 -2.21 
[-1.96]** 
-1.28 
EXCH 
 
+/- -3.33 
[-2.11]** 
-1.79 -7.22 
[-3.6]*** 
-3.93 -7.12 
[-3.5]*** 
-3.88 -7.05 
[-3.7]*** 
-3.88 
PORTAL 
 
+/- -0.51 
[-0.17] 
-0.28 -1.84 
[-0.66] 
-1.06 -2.38 
[-0.86] 
-1.36 -3.34 
[-1.15] 
-1.91 
Intercept 
 
 17.90 
[5.29]*** 
- 2.09 
[0.43] 
- -0.92 
[-0.19] 
- -5.27 
[-1.12] 
- 
MBA 
 
- - - 0.0952 
[1.36] 
0.0559 0.1066 
[1.54] 
0.0628 
 
0.0410 
[0.61] 
0.0243 
ROE 
 
+ - - 0.0850 
[5.72]*** 
0.0499 0.0864 
[5.85]*** 
0.5087 0.0784 
[5.42]*** 
0.0466 
Log (Total 
Asset) 
 
+ - - 1.37 
[4.66]*** 
0.8085 1.40 
[4.42]*** 
0.8255 1.03 
[4.21]*** 
0.6131 
ADR Dividend 
 
+/- - - 6.71 
[4.30]*** 
4.23 6.62 
[4.26]*** 
4.18 6.87 
[4.55]*** 
4.39 
Anti-Director 
 
+ - - - - 6.37 
[7.98]*** 
3.58 - - 
Common Law 
 
+ - - - - - - 9.66 
[11.69]*** 
5.90 
          
Industry Effects  Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Time Effects  No - No - No - No - 
Observations  27829 - 19769 - 19769 - 19769 - 
Censored Obs  4486 - 2581 - 2581 - 2581 - 
Log Likelihood 
 
 -111761 - -79922 - -79810 - -79546 - 
          
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the effect of cross listing on the ordinary 
dividend payouts of cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date.  Dividends-to-Cashflow is employed as the dependent 
variable. The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 countries over the 
period from 1990-2002.  Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and are defined in the 
Appendix.  Country controls are also defined in the appendix.  In each specification I report results for firms trading in the U.S. 
either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR [EXCH], or on the Portal under Rule 
144a [PORTAL].  *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  The pooled Tobit standard errors are 
robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group 
correlations.   Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit.  In columns 1-4 I include but do not report the estimates of the firm level 
means.  In all but one specification, an F-Test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level.  The marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of the independent variables.  For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete 
change in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.     
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Table 8: Tobit Analysis of Dividend Policy of cross-listed firms by legal origin – Dividend-to-Cashflow. 
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit 
  [1] dy dx/  [2] dy dx/  [3] dy dx/  [4] dy dx/  
OTC*AD 
 
+/- -2.40 
[-0.97] 
-1.30 -3.86 
[-1.41] 
-2.17 1.47 
[0.53] 
0.88 -2.39 
[-0.83] 
-1.38 
EXCH*AD 
 
+/- -4.87 
[-1.86]* 
-2.57 -10.72 
[-3.4]*** 
-5.57 -5.38 
[-1.69]* 
-2.98 -7.99 
[-2.55]** 
-4.32 
PORTAL*AD 
 
+/- -6.14 
[-1.84]* 
-3.19 -3.43 
[-1.38] 
-1.94 1.73 
[0.68] 
1.04 -1.33 
[-0.55] 
-0.78 
Intercept 
 
 15.78 
[4.69]*** 
- 17.29 
[1.26] 
- 14.59 
[1.06] 
- 5.85 
[0.43] 
- 
MBA 
 
- - - 0.0926 
[1.31] 
0.0544 0.0965 
[1.38] 
0.0568 0.0384 
[0.56] 
0.0228 
ROE 
 
+ - - 0.0832 
[5.6]*** 
0.0488 0.0842 
[5.7]*** 
0.0496 0.0774 
[5.35]*** 
0.0460 
Log(Total Asset) 
 
+ - - 1.20 
[4.11]*** 
0.7041 1.22 
[3.89]*** 
0.7151 0.8117 
[3.99]*** 
0.4820 
ADR Dividend 
 
+/- - - 5.65 
[3.79]*** 
3.52 4.79 
[3.22]*** 
2.97 4.33 
[3.02]*** 
2.69 
Anti-Director 
 
+ - - - - 6.29 
[7.53]*** 
3.53 - - 
Common Law 
 
+ - - - - - - 9.49 
[11.59]*** 
5.80 
          
Industry Effects  Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Time Effects  No - No - No - No - 
Observations  27829 - 19769 - 19769 - 19769 - 
Censored Obs  4486 - 2581 - 2581 - 2581 - 
Log Likelihood 
 
 -111770 - -79939 - -79839 - -79573 - 
          
In this table I report pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the effect of cross listing on the ordinary 
dividend payouts of cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date.  Dividends-to-Cashflow is employed as the dependent 
variable.  The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2,922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 countries over the 
period from 1990-2002.  Firm-level controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and are defined in the 
Appendix.  Country controls are also defined in the appendix.  In each specification I report results for firms trading in the U.S. 
either Over-the-Counter [OTC] as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange Listed ADR [EXCH], or on the Portal under Rule 
144a [PORTAL].  In this specification I interact the ADR Dummies with an investor rights measure developed by LLSV 
[1998].  The ADR measure is 1 if the firm is domiciled in a country where investors are poorly protected [AD<3].  *, **, *** 
Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  The pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and 
heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations.   Z-stats 
reported for the Pooled Tobit.  In columns 1-4 we include but do not report the estimates of the firm level means.  In all but 
one specification, an F-Test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level. .  For the dummy variables the marginal 
effects is calculated as the discrete change in F[x] as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.       
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Table 9: ‘After-Before’ closely held shares for cross-listed firms. 
 Level 1 OTC Level 2/3 Exchange Rule 144a Portal 
 Median CHS Median CHS Median CHS 
-2 85,116 37,604 15,476 
-1 101,690 40,830 15,113 
List Year 88,581 53,168 33,570 
∆[1,-2] 14,783 6,569 4,830 
∆[1,-1] [1,791] 3,343 5,193 
∆[2,-2] 871 [5,996] 32,574 
∆[2,-1] [15,703] [9,222] 32,937 
∆[3,-2] [16,346] 8,278 45,331 
∆[3,-1] [32,920] 5,052 45,694 
∆[4,-2] [15,499] 11,410 11,295 
∆[4,-1] [32,073] 8,184 11,653 
∆[5,-2] 592 [12,670] 11,295 
∆[5,-1] [15,982] [15,896] 11,658 
    
Before 73, 830 44,266 10,080 
After 80,707 48,453 23,484 
Difference 6,877 4,187 13,404 
    
In this table I report ‘before-after’ estimates of Closely Held Shares [Firm Governance] for firms that cross-list in the United 
States.  I report the median closely held share value for firms that list either as Level 1 ADRs [n = 214], Exchange-Listed Level 
2/3 [n = 137] and Ordinary Lists, or that trade under Rule 144a on Portal [n = 49].  Closely Held Shares [CHS] are shares held 
by insiders and are provided by Worldscope.  I calculate the change in CHS between the five year post-listing [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 
period and the two years pre-listing [-2, -1] [∆[1,-2], ∆[1,-1], ∆[2,-2], ∆[2,-1], ∆[3,-2], ∆[3,-1], ∆[4,-2], ∆[4,-1], ∆[5,-2], ∆[5,-
1]]. 
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Appendix 1: Correlation Coefficients and Variance Inflation Factors. 
 DivEarn DivCF COGS ROE Earn Vol. FCF Debt MBA Log (TA) VIF (DE) 
DivEarn 1 
 
        - 
DivCF 0.5937*** 
 
1        - 
COGS -0.0116** 
 
-0.0315*** 1       1.01 
ROE 0.0206*** 
 
0.1442*** -0.0446*** 1      1.08 
Earn Vol. -0.0310*** 
 
-0.0443*** 0.0202*** -0.0233*** 1     1.00 
FCF -0.0029 
 
-0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0084 0.0006 1    1.00 
Debt -0.0070 
 
-0.0060 -0.0005 -0.0116*** 0.0012 0.5411*** 1   1.01 
MBA -0.0303*** 
 
0.0159*** -0.0647*** 0.1730*** -0.0206*** -0.0065 -0.0028 1  1.06 
Log (TA) 0.0984*** 
 
-0.0153*** -0.0288*** -0.1240*** 0.0206*** -0.0361*** -0.0598*** -0.0540*** 1 1.03 
           
In this table I outline Pearson Correlation Coefficients for our dependent variables and all our independent variables.  In addition, I outline employing both variants 
of our dependent variable, Variance-Inflation Factors (VIF’s).  The Variance-Inflation Factors are defined as 2(1/(1 R ))−  where 2R  is from a regression (pooled) 
of an explanatory variable on a constant and the remainder of the explanatory variables.  ***, ** Represent significance at the 1 and 5% level of significance 
respectively.  
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